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ANrrrRUST IN A WORLD OF INTERRELATED ECONOMIES: THE IN-
TERPLAY BETWEEN ANrrrRUST AND TRADE POLICIES IN THE US 
AND THE EEC. By Mario Marques Mendes. Brussels: Editions de 
l'Universite de Bruxelles. 1991. Pp. xii, 285. 1,523 BF. 
In Antitrust in a World of Interrelated Economies, Mano Marques 
Mendes1 provides an insightful account of the conflict between anti-
trust and trade policy objectives in both the United States and the 
European Community (EC). 2 His main contention is simple indeed: 
antitrust, which aims to promote competition, and trade policy, which 
aims to protect domestic industry, operate at cross-purposes. Mendes 
skillfully elaborates this thesis throughout his book, showing the 
reader how the two policies conflict and how the enforcers of trade 
policy might better recognize the concerns behind antitrust policy. 
His book is full of insights into policymaking and decisionmaking at 
all levels. Mendes traces the history of antitrust and trade enforce-
ment in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development {UNCTAD) 
as adroitly as he discusses infighting between the Department of Jus-
tice and the International Trade Commission. His remarkable ability 
to discuss two major policies in two legal systems at once is ultimately 
the real strength of this book. 
Mendes divides the text into three parts. The first, "International 
Trade and International Antitrust: An Overview," summarizes the 
history of trade liberalization in the GATT and trade protection de-
spite the GATT (pp. 19-26). It then reviews the history of antitrust 
enforcement, noting that despite its mainly economic bases, one early 
political motivation for enforcement stemmed from an association of 
cartels with Naziism (p. 34). Mendes points up the limitations of 
purely domestic antitrust enforcement and decries the lack of regula-
tion of restrictive business practices on the international level. 3 His 
1. Mano Marques Mendes practices law in Lisbon and Brussels and teaches International 
Trade Law at the Center for European Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University. -Ed. 
2. Mendes' strategy is more global than most. Many scholars have noted the interrelation-
ship of antitrust and trade in the American setting, see, e.g., Harvey M. Applebaum, The Inter· 
face of Trade/Competition Law and Policy: An Antitrust Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 409 
(1987), or in the European setting. See, e.g., Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, Antitrust and Trade Policy: 
A Peaceful Coexistence? European Community Perspective, (pts. 1 & 2) 17 INTL. Bus. LAW. 58 
(1989), 17 INTL. Bus. LAW. 115 (1989). The scholars who explore the relationship between 
antitrust and trade in the European context often focus on conflicts between Member State indus-
trial policy and EC competition law, rather than examining the conflicts between the policies at 
the Community level. See HELEN PAPACONSTANTINOU, FREE TRADE AND COMPETITION IN 
THE EEC: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 202-08 (1988). 
3. Others, too, have called for greater international coordination in the antitrust area. Sir 
Leon Brittan, former Commissioner in charge of competition, called for the inclusion of antitrust 
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discussion of the lack of international antitrust enforcement is slightly 
out of date in that it fails to mention the 1991 agreement between the 
EC and the United States to coordinate antitrust enforcement.4 While 
currently in force, France is presently challenging the validity of the 
agreement in front of the European Court of Justice. 5 
The second part of the book, "The U.S. and EEC Antitrust Sys-
tems," completes the foundation for the intricate arguments of Part 
Ill Mendes' taxonomy of the interrelationships relevant to his in-
quiry begins in this part. He skillfully addresses the practical aspects 
of enforcement in the U.S. and the EC before finding that "all these 
aspects of antitrust enforcement cannot be looked at separately. They 
are all interrelated" (p. 68). Mendes further notes that, especially in 
the U.S., antitrust is not only complex in itself but also constitutes part 
of a broader economic policy (p. 65). The importance of economic 
criteria in American antitrust evaluations cannot be underestimated, 
while economics plays a lesser role in Community decisionmaking.6 
Mendes goes too far, however, when he characterizes the role of eco-
on the agenda of the next GATI round. He said: "An international body with powers to seek 
out and destroy cartels may come one day, but the international community is clearly not ready 
to contemplate this possibility yet. For the time being we should think about a clear agreement 
as to the rules relating to cartels .... " Brittan Calls for GATT Code on Competition, AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 3, 1992 (Econews section), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, 
ALLNWS File. 
4. Competition Laws Co-operation Agreement 1991 (EEC-USA), 4 C.M.L.R. 823 (1991). 
The agreement, signed on September 23, 1991, is not legally binding but sets up a formal proce-
dure for the exchange of information about companies suspected of antitrust infringement. The 
arrangement does not compromise the independent decisionmaking of each legal system's au-
thorities, but both sides have agreed to abide by the principle of international comity, whereby 
each side could request that its interests be taken into account by the other. Antitrust authorities 
from the United States and the EC first met in November, 1991. See Coopers & Lybrand, Trade 
Relations EC-USA and EC-Canada, EC COMMENTARIES, Apr. 15, 1993, § 5.10, available in 
LEXIS, Europe Library, EURSCP File. 
5. Case C-327/91, France v. Commission (initiated on 16 Dec. 1991 (pending)). A notifica-
tion of the bringing of the action is published at 1992 O.J. (C 28) 4. France argues that the 
agreement with the United States is ultra vires because it is not an administrative agreement, but 
an international agreement under Article 228(1) of the Treaty of Rome that must be concluded 
by the Council. See TREATY EsrABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC 
TREATY] art. 228(1); Competition: France Mounts Court Challenge to EEC-US Anti-Trust Agree-
ment, EuR. REP., Jan. 11, 1992, at 4 (Business Brief No. 1734), available in LEXIS, Europe 
Library, ALLNWS File; Charles Goldsmith, EC Defends Its U.S. Antitrust Pact, INTL. HERALD 
TRIB., Jan. 11, 1992 (Finance Section), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, ALLNWS File; see 
also Alan J. Riley, Nailing the Jellyfish: The Illegality of the EC/US Government Competition 
Agreement, 13 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 101 (1992) (arguing that the agreement is ultra 
vi res). 
6. Ascertaining the precise role economics will play in future competition evaluations in the 
EC is difficult because of the appointment this year of a new Competition Commissioner, Karel 
van Miert. The former Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, recognized the importance of economic 
efficiency criteria: "[O]ur approach is an economic, rather than a legal one. Competition law is 
rightly concerned with substance rather than form." SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY 
AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 37 (1991). There are fears, how-
ever, that van Miert will deemphasize economics: 
In anti-trust issues, Mr[.] Van Miert says, competition should. not be the only criterion: 
industrial, social and other factors also apply. Indeed they dci, but they are not the business 
1554 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1552 
nomics in the EC as "minor."7 In support of his contention, Mendes 
cites to the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Sixteenth Reports on Com-
petition Policy, but he neglects to examine more recent reports that 
place a greater emphasis on economic efficiency in the EC. 8 
Having found the goals of antitrust to be superior to those of trade 
policy by virtue of their promotion of competition and free trade, 
Mendes defines the useful limits of domestic antitrust policy by com-
mencing a detailed investigation of the vagaries of international sub-
ject matter jurisdiction (pp. 86-101). The foreign sovereign immunity, 
act-of-state, foreign sovereign compulsion, and other defenses may 
prevent a domestic antitrust policy from functioning effectively in the 
international arena (pp. 94-101). Mendes notes that where an indus-
try can choose between bringing an antitrust suit or an import relief 
proceeding, it will invariably choose the latter because the antitrust 
defenses will not apply (p. 166). 
Both legal systems tend to downplay international comity consid-
erations. 9 Moreover, both the U.S. and the EC tend to encourage or 
approve antitrust violations abroad, as the U.S. statute exempting ex-
port cartels from antitrust suits illustrates. 10 A fuller discussion of the 
statutory exemptions to the U.S. and EC antitrust laws would have 
of the competition commissioner. • . . If the result is to be a productive compromise, it is 
above all necessary that the competition commissioner should fight his corner. 
Keep Competing, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at 13. 
7. Mendes claims that, "[i]n a word, economic efficiency considerations when confronted 
with other concerns, be they market integration, the protection of specific industrial sectors or 
regions or even that of users and workers, have consistently played a minor role in the context of 
EEC competition policy." P. 83 (emphasis added). 
8. Seep. 118 nn.15-17; see also COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXIST 
REPORT ON CoMPETITION POLICY 42 (1992) (noting "one important limitation on the possibil-
ity of relying on cooperation and restructuring operations: companies can not be allowed to 
eliminate effective competition"). Mendes also cites to the earlier reports when he discusses the 
role of industrial policy in the Commission's decisionmaking. Pp. 241-43. There, he mentions 
the Sixth, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Reports, but it is striking that the Seventeenth Report is 
less openly in favor of accommodating industrial policy concerns in competition decisions than 
the earlier reports. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVENTEENTH RE-
PORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 51 (1988); see also COMMISSION, XXIST REPORT at 42-43. In-
dustrial policy is, however, receiving greater legitimation outside the competition area: the Single 
European Act of 1986 added Article 130fto the Treaty, which aims to "strengthen the scientific 
and technological basis of European industry." EEC TREATY art. 130f. If the Maastricht Treaty 
is ratified by the Member States, an entire title of the Treaty will be devoted to industrial policy. 
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [MAASTRICHT TREATY] art. G(38) (replacing EEC TREATY 
Title VI with Title XIII, art. 130). 
9. Pp. 86-101. The agreement between the United States and the EC takes comity into ac-
count, however. See supra note 4. 
10. Pp. 70-71. The Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988), grants 
limited immunity to export trade associations that do not restrain domestic trade or the export 
trade of other domestic enterprises. Webb-Pomerene associations may still be held to violate the 
EC antitrust laws, as in the Wood Pulp decision. Joined cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-17/85, 
and 125-29/85, A. Ahlstrom Oy v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988) 
(holding no foreign sovereign compulsion defense because export cartel was authorized but not 
compelled by the Webb-Pomerene Act). 
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been appreciated, especially as the U.S. exemption for export cartels11 
and the EC exemption for crisis cartels12 seem to accommodate trade 
policy objectives. 
At this point, Mendes attempts a preliminary comparison between 
the U.S. and EC antitrust systems that rings true in most respects but 
becomes deeply problematic when he explores it further in Part III. 
He asserts that "[t]he concentration one finds in the Common Market 
is in striking opposition to the decentralized U.S. institutional and en-
forcement structure" (p. 82). This is surely correct. The United 
States has a greater arsenal of antitrust enforcement agencies and in-
struments, while in the EC the Commission has greater powers than 
the Justice Department and the F.T.C. combined.13 Moreover, the 
American approach to antitrust is more deeply rooted in concerns of 
economic efficiency than that of the Community, with its "objective of 
market integration ... [as] the most important of the goals of EEC 
competition policy" (p. 74). Given the centralization in the EC, it is 
not surprising that "antitrust appears more obviously as one set of 
principles which has to be balanced against other equally relevant con-
siderations" (p. 138). In the United States, the reconciliation of anti-
trust with other policies, such as trade, may be achieved through 
interagency negotiation rather than intraagency decision, as the au-
thor's explanation of the LTV-Republic merger case illustrates so 
well. 14 
The author's logical assumptions in his preliminary comparison 
between the two antitrust systems in Part II lead to perplexing conclu-
sions when applied in Part III. Mendes finds that, "at least in theory," 
the reconciliation of trade and antitrust should be easier in the EC 
11. Mendes discusses U.S. statutory exemptions. Pp. 70-73. The export cartel exception is 
the most important. See supra note 10. 
12. "Crisis cartels" are organizations of producers in industries under severe economic pres-
sure. In general, the Community has a wider and more flexible range of antitrust exemptions 
than the United States. See pp. 73-81. The Commission may grant individual or group exemp-
tions for those restrictive practices which violate Article 85(1) of the Treaty, but satisfy the 
criteria of Article 85(3). See EEC TREATY art. 85. The Article 85(3) criteria are often met, so 
the number of exemptions granted is quite high. Two of the most utilized group exemptions 
concern specialization agreements and research and development agreements. Commission Reg-
ulation 417/85 on the Application of Art. 85(3) to Categories of Specialization Agreements, 1985 
O.J. (L 53) 1; Commission Regulation 418/85 on the Application of Art. 85(3) to Categories of 
Research and Development Agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5. 
13. Seep. 82 (noting in particular that the Commission has the power to grant individual and 
block exemptions from the antitrust rules, and that its "notices" have greater weight than the 
Department of Justice's "guidelines"). 
14. Pp. 239-48. The LTV-Republic steel merger was originally prohibited by the Depart-
ment of Justice. The Department reasoned that a merger between the third and fourth largest 
producers would increase concentration in the domestic market and likely lead to higher prices. 
After the President and the Commerce Department pressured the Justice Department to change 
its ruling, it upheld the merger, albeit with certain conditions attached. See pp. 239-48; Peter 
Bruce & Terry Dodsworth, Republic-LTV Deal is Approved, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1984, at 42; 
Rescued Merger, Lost Opportunity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1984, at A22. 
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than the U.S. because of the centralization of power in the Commis-
sion and the fact that all EC trade laws contain "Community interest" 
clauses requiring the consideration of other policies and interests 
before adopting trade sanctions (p. 168). He goes on to find, however, 
that the clauses do not really work; the Commission consistently up-
holds the interests of industry over the interest of the public in free 
competition (p. 169). Mendes becomes rather irate with the 
Commission: 
The rare cases in which it is said that competition considerations were 
taken into account do not show a change of attitude on the part of the 
Community authorities. The approach is confusing, if not puzzling; the 
motivation is poor, if at all existent; the inconsistencies are blatant if one 
compares such cases with usual analysis of EC institutions. [p. 171] 
He finds that, "[i]n short, what EC institutions are doing is promoting 
Community industrial policy. . . . The risk indeed exists, then, that 
the promotion of an industrial policy within the Community ... may 
degenerate into a clear expression of outright protectionism."15 The 
U.S. situation compares favorably with that in the EC. Mendes notes: 
Conversely, and strikingly enough, it is in the United States - where 
"public interest" clauses in trade laws are ineffective or non-existent, and 
where there are not only one but several agencies involved in antitrust 
and trade matters - that, through the efforts of the antitrust enforce-
ment authorities, competition arguments have been regularly submitted, 
sometimes successfully, in trade proceedings . . . . The fact is that much 
more was done, in apparently a not so favorable legal and institutional 
environment, than in the EEC, to bridge those differences. [p. 177] 
Yet, in the final part of the book, Mendes inexplicably reverses his 
position again. The book begins to feel like a detective novel - the 
United States is "guilty" because it has no "public interest" clauses, 
too many agencies, and the common law tradition. No, actually the 
EC is at fault because its "Community interest" clauses have no real 
effect. Suddenly, on page 243, the United States is fingered again: 
"while in the EEC antitrust is understandably balanced against other 
policy concerns, any attempt to adopt the same approach in the 
United States ... may be unrealistic." Mendes offers little support for 
this last reversal. He cites several of the Commission's Reports on 
Competition Policy and Article 130f of the Treaty of Rome, but gives 
no practical "in-the-trenches" advice as before on how the system re-
ally works. 16 As a result, his conclusion sounds a little hollow: "In 
15. Pp. 173-74. Many scholars have accused the Community of using industrial policy to 
attain protectionist goals. See, e.g., Derek Ridyard, An Economic Perspective on the EC Merger 
Regulation, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 247, 252 (1990) ("[C]ompanies based outside the EC 
may find that . . . the Commission will be more prone to upholding Member States' public 
interest objections to mergers if the bidder is a US or Japanese firm than one based in the EC."). 
16. Compare the author's summary conclusions about the EC's balancing of policy concerns 
with his earlier, more measured statement: 
Interestingly enough, it is just possible that the evolution in the system of judicial review in 
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the EEC, a centralized institutional system formulates antitrust rules 
and principles and enforces them in a flexible way ... " (p. 265). 
To be sure, Mendes' primary objective is not to compare the anti-
trust-trade balancing in the U.S. and the EC, but to communicate the 
need in both legal systems for trade protection decisions to take anti-
trust enforcement into account. Mendes further hopes that where the 
relevant authorities do not take antitrust into account, they will be 
made "aware of their own anticompetitive options and provid[e] those 
who are thereby affected with clear explanations for such policy 
choices" (p. 146). Nevertheless, his brief comparison between the two 
legal systems in Part II and further analysis of each system in Part III 
lead the reader to expect a more complete comparison of the pluses 
and minuses of each philosophy for reconciling antitrust and trade 
objectives. 
Mendes notes that there has been and will continue to be a certain 
amount of "cross-fertilization" between the two approaches to recon-
ciliation (p. 266). Complete harmonization is unlikely and undesir-
able, given the historical attachment of Americans to economic 
reasoning and of Europeans to industrial policy. Yet a more thorough 
account of the way each legal system balances antitrust and trade 
would enable the reader to decide what kind of cross-fertilization is 
beneficial for each system and to what extent. It would also help 
pinpoint what kind of international antitrust cooperation would be 
practical and successful. Having completed his interdisciplinary anal-
ysis, Mendes stops just short of completing a compelling comparative 
law analysis. 
The impressive observations and analyses in this book illustrate 
how certain trade measures in each legal system contravene the policy 
goals of antitrust. Mendes' discussion in Part III of how each U.S. 
trade law - except countervailing duties - runs afoul of the antitrust 
laws is superb. Mendes coyly asks "whether there is any fundamental 
reason for applying antitrust rules and principles in domestic trade 
while setting them aside in what concerns foreign trade which is dealt 
with by the import relief laws" (p. 144), before quite convincingly 
showing that all the fundamental reasons point the other way. He 
reveals that the only kind of dumping that violates the antitrust laws is 
predatory dumping, which is also the least likely to occur.17 He ad-
mits, however, that scrapping the antidumping laws is not feasible, 
the trade law context in the EEC - certainly not as complete and sophisticated as the one 
existing in the U.S. - which has been taking place (as well as the changes in the judicial 
structure) may end up in a greater scrutiny of the assessment made by EC institutions of the 
"public interest" element in trade cases, which may in due time influence the institutions' 
approach under that concept. 
P. 197 (emphasis added). 
17. Pp. 149-51. See generally Charles F. Rule, Claims of Predation in a Competitive Market-
place: When is an Antitrust Response Appropriate?, 57 ANTITRUsr L.J. 421 (1988). 
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given the weakness of domestic antitrust law in the international 
arena. He finds the escape clause, too, works against competition18 
but alleges the greatest difficulties are with section 337 of the 1930 
Tariff Act, which is ironically "the one most resembling the antitrust 
laws and yet the most criticized for the anticompetitive concerns 
raised by its application."19 
Mendes' analysis of the antitrust problems arising from trade liti-
gation in the U.S. and the EC is also compelling. He finds more simi-
larities than differences between the two systems (pp. 193-97). Some 
differences persist, however, which Mendes catalogues quite elegantly. 
In the United States, companies tread a fine line between lobbying and 
unlawfully exchanging business information (pp. 179-80). Voluntary 
restraint and similar agreements also pose antitrust risks in the United 
States after the Consumers Union case,20 while these risks are some-
what less in the Ec.21 
Mendes writes the first and second parts of his book casually and 
compactly. They are complete enough, however, to prepare the reader 
for the more interesting discussion in Part III, where all of the argu-
ments previously developed finally interrelate. Unfortunately, Part III 
is as brief and casual as the first two parts. The plethora of exclama-
tion points - three on page 170 alone! - can be forgiven. The au-
thor, after all, is terribly upset about the Commission's failure to take 
the Community interest into account when deciding on trade sanc-
tions. Despite being impressed by his fervor, however, after patiently 
reviewing the history of antitrust and trade in expectation of this final 
synthesis, the reader wishes to explore some of his arguments in more 
detail. The two page conclusion is at once simplistic and cryptic. 
18. P. 158. The escape clause is contained in§§ 201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2011-18 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54 (1988 & Supp. III 
1991)). It allows the President to take action to protect an industry when increased imports are a 
substantial cause or threat of serious injury. 
19. P. 165. Section 337 deems unlawful any unfair methods of competition that destroy or 
substantially injure an American industry, prevent the establishment of the industry, restrain or 
monopolize trade in the United States, or threaten to do any of the above. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 
(a)(l)(A)(i)-(iii) (1988). See generally Daniel J. Plaine et al., Protection of Competitors or Protec-
tion of Competition: Section 337 and the Antitrust Laws, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 519 (1987). 
20. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973). Seep. 185. 
Voluntary restraint and similar agreements typically involve informal negotiations between gov-
ernments or between government and a foreign industry resulting in the foreign government or 
industry's "voluntary" decision to limit imports. The court in Consumers Union upheld the 
President's authority to negotiate with foreign companies but denied that he had authority to 
give "binding assurances" of exemption from the antitrust laws. 352 F. Supp. at 1323-24. 
21. [W]hile measures taken in pursuance of trade agreements between the Community and 
third countries, as acts of external commercial policy, are not caught by Article 85(1) of the 
EEC Treaty, agreements or concerted practices among foreign producers aimed at restrict-
ing exports to the EEC or at regulating their price or quality, unless imposed on such produ-
cers by the foreign authorities (foreign sovereign compulsion defense), would fall under the 
reach of EEC antitrust rules. 
P. 195 (citations omitted). 
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In the final analysis, Mendes does an extraordinarily good job of 
isolating the conflicts between antitrust and trade policy in the United 
States and the European Community, but he leaves the reader some-
what baffied as to which legal system better resolves these conflicts. 
He also does not explain how an international agreement might best be 
structured for effectiveness and acceptance. Mendes ultimately raises 
as many interesting questions as he answers. 
- Alyssa A. Grikscheit 
